

Andrei Gromyko's statement about "viable solution" is what decided this position on partition. Bernadotte was also killed & Gromyko was against the appointment.

This connection to British & Yugoslav & Eastern European "intrigues" also can't be minimized:

19. *Trud*, 7 January 1948. The measures against "progressive" elements referred to steps taken in Syria and Lebanon against the local Communist party as well as the closing down of the friendship associations with the USSR which existed in both countries. (The premises of the Syrian Society for Cultural Relations with the USSR in Damascus had been broken into and looted by an angry but organized mob as early as 30 November 1947, together with the U.S. Legation in the same city—*Foreign Relations . . . 1947*, vol. 5, p. 1292; cf. below.)

21. *R. Moscow for Soviet Asia*, 6 March 1948/SWB I, 12 March 1948, quoting *inter alia Krasnaia zvezda*. (General Anders had headed the army that during World War II held allegiance to the Polish government-in-exile situated in London and was opposed to the new Polish regime.) See also, for example, *New Times*, 9 June 1948; *Pravda*, 14 June 1948; *Vecherniaia Moskva*, 19 June 1948. The Arab armies also absorbed in the winter of 1947? groups of Yugoslav Muslims who opposed the Communist regime in their own country —*R. Sharq al-Adnā*, 13,15 January 1948; *R. Cairo*, 13 January 1948/SWB III, 22 January 1948; and SC OR, 3rd Year, Nos. 36-51, 270th Meeting, 19 March 1948.

And it's not as though the arab nations or the influx of anti-Communist Muslim groups even from Yugoslavia were orienting themselves as great champions of Soviet foreign policy.

There was an enormous effort to downplay this maneuver, but the argument that there was also a split in the central committee makes enough sense.

Some good period information there in the footnotes:

Ro'i, Yaacov. Soviet Decision-Making in Practice: The USSR and Israel, 1947-1954. United Kingdom, Taylor & Francis, 2018.

As we know, the aspirations of a considerable part of the Jewish people are linked with the problem of Palestine and of its future administration. This fact scarcely requires proof. ... During the last war, the Jewish people underwent exceptional sorrow and suffering. ...

The United Nations cannot and must not regard this situation with indifference, since this would be incompatible with the high principles proclaimed in its Charter. ...

Gromyko makes his own reasoning clear here though, the failure to stem this tide & the facts of the war don't have to be used as "justification" necessarily. However they can't be ignored.

The fact that no Western European State has been able to ensure the defence of the elementary rights of the Jewish people and to safeguard it against the violence of the fascist executioners explains the aspirations of the Jews to establish their own State. It would be unjust not to take this into consideration and to deny the right of the Jewish people to realize this aspiration.^[3]

Europe's problem is the "Jewish Question", since Europe never really dealt with this as a social issue, always by political heavy-handedness.

We also have to remember that the State Department & British intelligence were thrown for a loop when USSR supported partition:

28. On 19 January the State Department Policy Planning Staff had sent a report to Secretary Marshall, recommending that the United States "take no further initiative in implementing or aiding partition" and suggesting that "when and if the march of events" demonstrates that the partition plan "offers no reasonable prospect for success without the use of outside armed force, we should then take the position that we have been obliged to conclude that it is impracticable and undesirable for the international community to attempt to enforce any form of partition in the absence of agreement between the parties, and that the matter should go back to the UN General Assembly." The report suggested that the United States cooperate in investigating "the possibilities of any other suggested solution such as a federal state or trusteeship."

One of the main reasons for the concern of the Policy Planning Staff was that partition would facilitate Soviet military and political penetration of the Middle East. This might take the form a. of bringing in Soviet forces to help implement partition which would provide "Communist agents" with "an excellent base from which to extend their subversive activity, to disseminate propaganda, and to attempt to replace the present Arab governments by 'democratic peoples' governments.' This would also mean outflanking the U.S. "position in Greece,

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Turkey and Iran"; b. of exploiting "the explosive character of the situation created by partition" by aggravating friction. Evidence was indeed "accumulating that the USSR may be covertly or indirectly supplying arms not only to the Jews but to the Arabs" (see following chapter); c. of creating "a pretext on the basis of 'self-determination of minorities' to encourage the partition of areas in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Greece"—*Foreign Relations . . . 1948*, vol. 5, part 2, pp. 546-54.

Relating to the report, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs at the Department, Dean Rusk, said on 26 January that "a major change in our Palestine policy would require the approval of the President as well as of leading Members of Congress" —ibid., pp. 556-57. On 4 February U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, George Wadsworth, was told by Truman that he was in "close touch" with the situation, and "saw alike with the State Department" —ibid., pp. 592-95.

They knew the USSR weren't necessarily trying to take a "moral high road" and saw it as a direct counter to their own geopolitical aims in the region. As well as a way for the USSR to try and penetrate the area & disrupt this 50 years long drive.

THE END